A system with a high degree of availability and survivability can be created via service duplication on disparate server platforms, where a compromise via a previously unknown attack is detected by a voting mechanism. However, shutting down the compromised component will inform the attacker that the subversion attempt was unsuccessful, and might lead her to explore other avenues of attack. This paper presents a better solution by transforming the compromised component to a state of honeypot; removing it from duty, while providing the attacker with bogus data. This provides the administrator of the target system with extra time to implement adequate security measures while the attacker is busy "exploiting" the honeypot. As long as the majority of components remain uncompromised, the system continues to deliver service to legitimate users.
Introduction
The history of the Internet shows that it is not possible to develop a system that is both impervious to attack and useful (i.e., provides anything more than rudimentary functionality) -no matter how carefully crafted the armor may be, the vandals 1 always seem to be able to find a chink in it. Attacks on e-commerce installations and general web sites frequently employ platform-specific exploits based on known vulnerabilities. In later years, the "patch window" has been steadily decreasing, to the point where we now face "zero-day exploits" that are being wielded even before a patch for the specific vulnerability is generally available. Clearly, new mechanisms are required to combat this threat. Our contribution to the cause is a system for Increasing Survivability by dynamic deployment of Honeypots (ISH). In the following, we will discuss the theoretical backgound and describe our prototype ISH implementation.
Background
Protagonists of honeypots have by many been considered the lunatic fringe of the computer security community, but Lance Spitzner [2] and the Honeynet Project Indeed, the idea of "peering over the shoulder" of an active hacker has been pursued by many, and classic papers such as [7] and [8] describe how pioneering defenders in an ad-hoc fashion have thrown together what in reality were the first (after-the-fact) honeypot systems 2 . The idea of dynamically transforming a compromised system to a state of honeypot was introduced in [9] , but the authors did not describe in detail how this might be accomplished. Disparity and redundancy are classic tenets of dependability [10] and (by extension) survivability. We have employed the definition of survivability given in [11] , but with added emphasis on malicious activity rather than accidental incidents. [12] is an architecture that aims to provide a system invulnerable to attack, using replication, software diversity and a voting mechanism. -Bait and Switch Honeypot [13] is an open source project that is in many ways similar to our own. The main difference is that Bait and Switch uses a firewall proxy to direct malicious traffic to a (permanent) honeypot server, and relies solely on an Intrusion Detection System (Snort [14] ) to differentiate legitimate from malicious activity. -Shadow Honeypots [15] also employ a proxy-like mechanism to classify traffic, routing suspicious traffic to a special shadow server that makes a final decision. -MPITS [16] is a relatively simple system that employs disparity and redundancy to offer a basis for intrusion tolerance. We have employed MPITS as an important component in the prototype implementation of ISH; MPITS is described further in section 2.2. Note that ISH depends on service replication on disparate software platforms, but not directly on MPTIS.
Related Work -SITAR

Minimal Proxy for Intrusion Tolerant Systems
MPITS was developed by Broen [16] to provide a less complex basis for intrusion tolerant systems, that additionally would serve as a reference system when comparing existing, more complex systems. Although existing intrusion tolerance
